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INTERNATIONAl

Changing of
the Guard

By Linus Hoskins

Last October 30th, approximately 80
percent of Jamaica's one million voters
went to the polls and elected a proWestern government. Election day was
marked by outbursts of violence, including at least three deaths and an alleged
assassination attempt at then-opposition
leader Edward Seaga. It was a landslide
victory for the captialist Jamaica Labor
Party (JLP) over the progressive People's
National Party (PNP). Unofficial results
have indicated that the JLP won 53.4 percent of the votes, compared to 46.6 percent for the PNP, which means that the
JLP captured 51 of the 60 seats in
Parliament.
The ousted prime minister, Michael
Manley, did, however, win his parliamentary seat. But his finance minister, Hugh
Small, and deputy prime minister of foreign affairs, P. J. Patterson, lost their
seats, along with two other cabinet
ministers.
The question that now arises is: What
does this mean for the Third World liberation strugg Ie in general and for the Jamaican people in particular?
In broad terms, certain peculiarities that
occurred on election day, such as the disappearance of ballots, intimidation of voters and the stuffing of ballot boxes are
reminiscent of the events that took place
during the 1963 elections in Guyana when
Marxist Cheddi Jagan was ousted and in
his place conservative Forbes Burnham
elected. (The majority of the Guyanese
people have since lived to regret Burnham's reign and now history's tragedy has
befallen the Jamaican people).
The supporters of the PNP have vowed
that without Michael Manley there would
be violent revolution and retribution.
Edward Seaga, the new prime minister,
has promised public integrity and a moderate government. His first priorities include the restoration of economic progress, the expulsion of the Cubans,
including the Cuban ambassador, whom
Seaga has accused as a meddler in local
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politics, and establishing close ties with
the United States.
In specific terms, one must begin with
the philosophical premise that in everything bad there is something good. For
the past eight years that the PNP has been
in office, not enough attention was given
to financial/economic control, planning
and administration. This has had a dramatic impact on the living standards of
the Jamaican people. Even then, the majority of the Jamaican people continued
to support the PNP. However, circumstances forced them to substitute their
empty bellies for political reasoning. They
gambled on the JLP, hoping for a better
day.
The defeat of the PNP may spell five
years of capitalist exploitation and the
possible return to the country of the professional class who fled the country upon
sensing the tramplings of PNP's Democratic Socialism. They now stand to reap
economic gains in view of the new JLP administration's plan to transform Jamaica
into an exemplary free enterprise state.
Also, the defeat of Manley may have
dealt a very potent moral blow to the
liberation struggle in Southern Africa and
in the Third World. The PNP administration pursued an activist foreign policy
toward apartheid, racism and imperialism
in Southern Africa. The new Jamaican
government is likely to pursue a passive,
pro-Western foreign policy posture.
Domestic Political Setting

Jamaica's political structure is patterned after the British Westmi.l:istermodel
of government-the two-party system. But
if one were to critically examine this twoparty system one must conclude that the
institutions therein have proven to be inadequate for the Jamaican society because they have not been devised for a
colonized society but are part of the inheritance of the colonial era-borrowed
from the imperialist power and imitatively
implanted in the local environment. Ja-

aican political scientist Louis Lindsey
points out:
The adoption of the Westminster model
of competitive two-party government facilitates the persistence of imperalist
control since the model surreptitiously
and erroneously, separates political
power from economic power and prevents economic power holders from the
control of its constitutional provisions.
(Furthermore it lends support) to the illusion that government is government
of the people and for the people. And
ironically, it is this illusion which alienates the (Jamaican) people from their
potential and ossifies colonially generated myths which keep the society
locked into a status quo of poverty,
multifaceted dependency, and persistent deprivation. 1
Of Jamacia's two political parties, the
P, led by Manley, has been the more
adical or progressive. Since coming to
oower in 1972, the PNP has advocated
state control of the economy, coopera- es, greater democratization of the political system, a more explicit nationalist
oosture, and social ist ideals geared to
oopularize eglitarianism.
On the contrary, the JLP, led by Seaga,
efends the virtues of the free enterprise
:::apitalist system, opposes the PNP's ad..ocacy of sweeping structural changes in
society and the economy but merely
omises better living conditions for the
rking class and the peasantry while
symbolically championing the cause of
socially oppressed under the clarion
I that "deliverance is near."
8y the end of the 1962-72 decade, the
establ ished the institutional infracture to shift the political economy of
- aica from a free enterprise system to
of emergent state capitalism. But
leaders of the progressive populist
ement of the late 1960s who were ab-.red into the PNP after the 1972 victory
easingly sought to define the demo~ ization issue in terms of expanding the
_ of the state beyond state capital ism

to a state controlled political economy to
serve people's needs more effectively
and to weaken the power base of the
bourgeois interests."
In sum, during the past eight years, the
PNP sought to govern Jamaica in the interest of the masses. The contention that
the PNP is run by Marxists and Communists who have their mind set on turning Jamaica into a one-party dictatorial
state appears to be nothing more than a
ploy by the JLP and its supporters. In real ity,the PNP is not controlled by Marxists,
although there are a handfuI of Marxists or
Communists in the membership. But they
hardly influence policy.
The PNP Record

Now, let us look at the record of the PNP
since Michael Manley took office in 1972.
The domestic record includes the undertaking of an unprecedented land reform
program; national control over public
utilities; the creation of sugar workers' cooperatives; the imposition of the bauxite
levy; the institution of a Minimum Wage
and Labor Relations Act; an end to discrimination against illegitimate children;
compulsory recognition of trade unions;
equal rights for women including equal
pay for equal work and the appointment of
women to senior positions; free education
at the university level; nutrition subsidies
for 70,000 children; rent rollback in depressed areas; national day care programs; an increase in public assistance;
the establishment of community farms;
special loans to farmers; an attack on
adult illiteracy; the restoration of civil
liberties and an end to harassment of individuals for political reasons.
Onthe international scene, Jamaica became a Third World force with an independent foreign policy and a supporter of
the liberation struggles in Southern Africa.
More importantly, the PNP instilled a
sense of national pride and self-worth in
the Jamiacan people. It made them aware,
in a historical context, of past exploitation/
oppression and of the necessity to devise
strategies for total liberation.

When one speaks to the average Jamaican on the streets of Kingston, he or
she not only expounds lucidly on the linkage between Jamaica's economic plight
and Western imperial ism but is also able
to articulate the positive policies the PNP
has instituted while at the same time not
hesitating to list some of the failures.
Under the JLP government, before PNP .
came to power in 1972, women received
less pay than men; teachers received no
government support; there was no nutrition program; exploitation of tenants and
sugar workers was the ruIe rather than the
exception; master-slave relationships existed; consolidation of big business exer~
cised political power.
The reign of JLP, from 1962 to 1972,was
characterized by power to the elite, capitalism, power for the few, wealth for the
few, opportunity for the few and a bright
future for the few. In fact, during those 10
years, domestic and foreign capitalists
. had such a lucrative time that Jamaica
was labeled the "island of the future" and
"the new Riviera."
Once again, the JLP is in power.
During the election, the JLP discounted
all the positive achievements of the PNP
and presented itself as the only alternative
to rescue Jamaica from its political and
economic plight, and promised to restore
intemational confidence in the economy.
JLP supporters were adamant in their
insistence that the PNP is run by what
they call "vulgar Marxists" who have
steered the country into a "silent civil
Cold War" and that Manley is a "political
opportunist" whose primary concern is to
carve a place for himself in the annals of
world history. Understandably, they feared
PNP's democratic socialism and were
prepared to change it at any cost.
Unfortunately for the PNP and its supporters, the machinations of the JLP and
the spurious tactics/accusations of its
followers were successful and sufficient
to stymie the PNP'ssocialistic reforms and
political independence.
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Economic Situation
Like other so-called Third World countries, Jamaica's economic health leaves
much to be desired. While some of the
country's economic ills stem from mismanagement and poor planning (which
the PNP readily admitted) nevertheless
one must consider the openness of the
Jamaican economy, its vulnerability to
fluctuations in the global economy and
the working of the international capitalist
system.
Jamaica falls within the upper middle
income group of developing countries and
has a per capita income of $1,070 (1976).
The country's GNP stood at $2.2 billion in
1976 while the annual population growth
has been 1.7 percent. Unemployment is
posited at31 percent while the public debt
figure is$1.3 billion, in addition to an $800
million oil import bill and a $150 million
food import bill. According to the World
Bank, the Jamaican economy did experience negative growth during the past few
years.
The unemployment figure is even more
appalling when one realizes that among
young men between the ages of 14 and 19
the rate was 50.6 percent as of October
1979; 33 percent for those between 20
and 24 years; and 16.4 percent for those
25 to 34 years. In the case of younger
women, just under 30 percent in the agegroup of 35 to 44 years were unemployed
during the same time; among those 25 to
34 years, the rate was 42.8 percent; in the
20 to 24 years group, 60.2 percent; and
among the 14 to 19 years group a staggering 82.4 percent.
Needless to say, the PNPadministration
had to devise strategies and programs to
rectify the economic hardships faced by
the Jamaican people in order to win the
election. The majority of the Jamaican
people are suffering economically. In
some instances, bananas are the only food
hundreds of people live on while others
get meat once every six months. The unemployment siutation must also be solved
in order to head off social unrest and
disorder.
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1981

Prior to the recent election, the main
concern of the PNPgovemment had been
to "try to provide the facilities through
which the poorest of the land can begin to
walk up the ladder of success" 3 and to
deal with the problem of mismanagement.
In August, Hugh Small, then-minister of
finance, tabled in the Jamaican House of
Representatives a proposal to improve
the system of financial management and
expenditure control that existed in the
public sector. The new financial management plan included regular submission
and updating of projected monthly expenditures and intemal monitoring and
reporting systems.
Similar measures were proposed for
expenditure control, with govemment
ministries and departments required to
submit to the Accountant General, for approval, a daily summary of checks to be
drawn. Penalties were to be instituted for
breach of this instruction. In addition, no
further financial obligations were to be
assumed for new programs and projects.
The instructions also stipulated that all expenditure programs must be reviewed on
quarterly basis. Steps were also taken to
improve the quantity and quality of management personnel to ensure proper accounting for expenditures and effective
management of resources.'
The hope was that the new measures
would go a long way in allaying some of
the aspects of mismanagement and financial maladministration.
Jamaica and the IMF
One of the fallouts of Jamaica's economic crisis is the unfortunate fact that
since 1977 the Manley administration was
forced into the arms of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial bailout.
For many years, Third World countries
have complained about the destabilizing
role, arrogant power and the negative pol icies of the IMF toward the Third World.
Bitter confrontations between Third World
countries and the IMF occur with great
frequency as in the recent cases of Peru,
Tanzania, Chile and Jamaica.

The IMF was established in 1944 by
Westem planners to help countries with
balance of payments difficulties. There
was also the unwritten understanding that
it was to be the "policeman" of international capitalism and also serve as the
medium through which the economies of
the Third World would be locked into a
state of dependency on the capitalist
metropolis, ad infinitum.
Inaddition, when a country seeks a loan,
the IMF imposes tough conditions which
include control on imports and foreign exchange, devaluation of currency, cut in
govemment spending, especially in the
basic human needs categories of health,
education and welfare; control of bank
credit, higher interest rates and higher
reserve requirements, increase in taxes
and prices charged by public enterprises,
abolition of consumer subsidies, control
of wage increases, dismantling of price
controls and greater hospitality to foreign
investment. The IMF rationale is that investment by multi-national corporations is
the only means of growth for Third World
countries.
In July 1977, Jamaica and the IMF
worked out a Stand-by Agreement involving a $75 mi IIion loan. Because of the
country's economy, the IMF "softened" its
usual position and tolerated the dual exchange rate system with a basic rate to
cover imports of essential commodities
such as food and oil. Jamaica's liberal
wages policy remained but there had to
be a large reduction in government expenditure ($140 mill ion) in return.
The IMF set the follO'Ning quarterly targets: Net Domestic Assets. Net International Reserves. Net Banking System
Credit to the Public Sector.
InDecember 1977,when Jamaica failed
to meet one of the targets (The Net Domestic Assets of the Bank of Jamaica) by
a margin of $9 million, the IMF suspended
the Stand-by Agreement. It came up with
a new proposal: that Jamaica should negotiate a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Program and go along with a

further devaluation of its currency. Jamaica agreed.
The IMF drew out negotiations of an
Extended Fund Facility for four months
between February and May 1978, whi Ie
the Jamaican economy experienced serious difficulties because of the lack of foreign exchange. The following things
happened:
• Jamaica was unable to pay for imports
of raw materials and supplies of basic,
essential commodities.
• Threats of worker lay-offs intensified.
• Production was disrupted and some
factories were forced to cut back.
• Migration of skilled persons and leakages of foreign exchange to the tune of
$300 million occurred.
InMay 1978,Jamaica agreed to a threeyear Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Program with drastic, draconian terms and
conditions. The main elements of the first
year of the program were:
• Unification of the exchange rate plus a
15% currency devaluation of the unified
rate was set into effect. This meant a 47%
devaluation of the old basic rate applying
to essential imports of basic necessities
plus an additional 15% in monthly installments from May 1978 to May 1979.
• Additional taxes on consumer goods
were instituted.
• Incentives were given to the private
sector by the lifting of price controls and
guaranteed 20% rate of profit. The objective was to secure more private sector investment and expansion.
• There was a reduction in the standard
of living of workers by the imposition of a
15% ceiling on wage increases while currency devaluation and the removal of
price controls generated a 40% increase
in prices.
Jamaica carried out all aspects of the
1978 agreement faithfully, yet the country
continued to experience worsening economic conditions.
In May 1979, Jamaica agreed to institute a "social contract" to limit both wage
increases and price increases to 10%.The
JLP opposition rejected the "social con-

tract." Foreign exchange targets were lic enterprises and the overall efficiency
fixed forthe elimination of payment arrears of govemment operations.
These were not areas which gave Jaand the accumulation of over $50 million
liquid reserves by December 1979. Fiscal maica problems in principle, since the
targets were set to limit bank credit to the government agreed that there were a
government. The IMF enlarged the lend- number of areas where adjustments and
ing program to a total of $248 million from improvements had to be made. This was
why in December 1979 the Jamaican govits supp lementary fac iIity.
ernment took action to cut down the numEvenwith the IMF'sapproval and having
met all the tests for a year, Jamaica was ber of ministries from 20 to 13 as the first
unable to secure re-financing of the major step in restructuring the government
portion of its external commercial debt by machinery. The Jamaica National InvestSeptember 1979.The country was also un- ment Corporation immediately began to
able to secure significant new external make a careful study of the major public
bank loans, because a consortium of com- sector enterprises in order to identify
mercial banks deferred consideration of a steps necessary to improve their effi$650 million re-financing proposal for ciency and to reduce their operating
losses.
Jamacia's external debts.
Against this backqround, Jamaica
Jamaica's foreign exchange earning
could not meet the unexpected increase agreed to several demands of the IMF,alin payments. As a result, there was a for- though recognizing that many of these aceign exchange gap of$130 million. By De- tions could bring increased hardships to
cember 1979,the IMFperformance targets the people. However, it was recognized
were not met. Analysis shows that 80% of that some of the steps were necessary,
the foreign exchange shortfall was due to with or without the IMF.
There was a breakdown in the negotiaseveral major factors outside of Jamaica's
control. The remaining 20% was due to an tions in January 1980.The IMF insisted on
error in estimation of the overhang of 1978 cutting the recurrent budget by an extra
imports due for payment in 1979- an esti- $50 million. This would have meant the
lay-off of some 11,000 workers or cutting
mate in which IMF officials participated.
several peoples' programs; removal of all
In terms of the budget, between April
and May 1979, Jamaica fell short of the subsidies from food, the Jamaican Omnibus Service (JOS) and fertilizers; making
program targets by some J$100 million.
This was due to shortfalls in projected re- all students at the University of the West
ceipts; viz: $40 million in foreign loans, Indies and other educational institutions
pay tuition, and other measures which
$40 million on domestic non-bank financwould have meant hardships for millions
ing, $20 million on tax revenue.
Jamaica was led to believe that the IMF of people. This was unacceptable to the
understood the problem and would there- Jamaican government.
New negotiations began but by March
fore be sympathetic to an application for a
waiver from the December performance 22, 1980, it became clear that the IMF retests. Itwas agreed that Jamaica's exports quirements were too difficult to meet.
had once again become competitive and Therefore, it became quite evident that a
that the incomes pol icy was being effec- continuance of negotiations with the IMF
tively implemented. The main issues was no longer feasible. The Jamaican
raised in the discussions with the IMF had government reasoned that the welfare and
to do with the size of the government interest of the Jamaican people would not
deficit-the gap between available gov- be protected and safeguarded if it entered
ernment revenue and expenditure; the ef- into the new IMF agreement. This is the
fectiveness of expenditure controls in reasonwhyon March 22, 1980the National
central government; the efficiency of pub- Executive Council of the PNP recomNEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1981
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mended to the government that negotiations with the IMF for a Stand-by Agreement be broken off.

To the PNP, nonalignment meant independence of judgment. As Manley stated
unequivocally:
We are the masters in our house and in
our house there shall be no other masters but us. Above all, we are not for
sete?

Democratic Socialism

24

Many people suggest that Jamaica's
economic ills are directly correlated to the
PNP's adoption (Nov. 20,1974) of Democratic Socialism. This pronouncement, the
argument goes, resulted in a massive
frenzied exodus of the professional,
middle-class and wealthy Jamaicans, disinvestment, high unemployment, and the
decline of economic growth. But, to the
end, the Manley administration remained
dedicated tothis policy, which it regarded
as the only remedy to generate economic
justice and self-reliance in Jamaica.
Michael Manley defines his party's
philosophy of Democratic Socialism as:
an economic strategy based on two
things: the belief that the commanding
heights of the economy must be under
public ownership ... and that for the
rest of the economy what we see is a
very dynamic role for the private sector
but a socially reponsible private sector.
A private sector that works within the
overall frame of politically defined national social objectlvee»
The PNP's socialism acted as a vehicle
for self-assertion against a colonial past
and a mechanism for the creation of a
sense of national pride and international
purpose. Formerministerof foreign affairs,
P. J. Patterson explains:
We commit ourselves to the building of

a democratic society in which people
will be motivated by the spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood and understand
they have to build a nation through cooperation rather than to be inspired
purely by profit and a sense of greed ....
(We) reject the notion that in our situation we could base the future upon a
system of capitalism which involves the
exploitation of people and obligates individuals to pursue private gain at the
expense of their fellow citizens without
regard to any other interest.... (We) reaffirm the belief that it is the sovereign
right of a people, under a democratic
system, to select their own government
without any interference from any other
nation wnetsoever»
It is this last credo that underlies the
fact that the PNP's non-alignment foreign
policy represented a logical extension of
the party's domestic policy of Democratic
Socialism.
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1981

This independence of judgement compelled the PNP government to support the
Cuban involvement in the Angolan war of
liberation in 1975, and the call for the independence of Puerto Rico. It has also led
to close ties between Jamaica and Cuba,
the Soviet Union and other Eastern and
Western countries.
Although the PNP administration supported the U. S. position against the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the holding
of American hostages in Tehran, Jamaica
did not support the U. S. call for a boycott
of the Moscow Olympics.
The Manley government also conducted
a consistent anti-apartheid policy and did
receive world acclaim for its support of
the liberation movements in Southern
Africa.
0
Linus Hoskins, Ph.D., is professor of political
economy, Washington International University.
visited Jamaica during the recent elections.
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